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Abstract—Multi-hop ad hoc networks are susceptible to selfish misbehavior such as traffic remapping attacks (TRAs). Selfish nodes
launching such attacks receive unjustifiably high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher priority to source packets and lower
priority to transit packets. TRAs are easy to execute, impossible to prevent, difficult to detect, and detrimental to the QoS of non-selfish
nodes. In this paper we adopt a game-theoretic approach to analyze TRAs in multi-hop ad hoc networks. We present a formal model of
plausible opportunistic TRAs and the corresponding one-shot and multistage non-cooperative games. Using a heuristic rank-based
payoff function, we propose a boundedly rational multistage attack strategy called REST (Random Exploration until Satisfaction
Threshold) that both selfish and non-selfish nodes are free to use, and that allows non-selfish nodes to respond in kind to TRAs. We
use simulations to analyze the properties of REST: convergence (whether all nodes eventually become satisfied), rationality (whether
all nodes have better QoS), and defensibility (whether non-selfish nodes can improve their QoS). We show that REST converges
towards equilibria at which nodes are restrained from executing harmful TRAs, whereas harmless TRAs are permitted. Therefore,
REST can be considered an effective countermeasure to TRAs in multi-hop networks.
Index Terms—Ad hoc networks, game theory, IEEE 802.11, misbehavior, multihop networks, quality of service, selfish attacks
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1 INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS multi-hop ad hoc networks rely on themutual cooperation of nodes, such as forwarding
packets on behalf of out-of-range source and destination
nodes. This entails certain costs: the energy spent on the
transmission of transit packets and the decreased chan-
nel bandwidth available for source (i.e., locally generated)
packets. The requirement of cooperation makes ad hoc net-
works susceptible to various kinds of attacks; particularly
harmful are those performed by selfish insiders, i.e., stations
that have already been authenticated (and are a legitimate
part of the network) and that abuse network mechanisms
to achieve an undue increase of the quality of service (QoS).
E.g., by disseminating false routing advertisements, a node
may prevent establishing paths that traverse it and thus
avoid forwarding transit traffic. This necessitates secure
routing protocols [1], intrusion detection systems [2], or
trust management frameworks [3]. However, a more subtle
method, referred to as the traffic remapping attack (TRA) [4],
can be used to bring an attacker better QoS at a low execu-
tion cost and a low risk of detection. A node performing a
TRA falsely assigns traffic to classes: either source packets
are assigned higher priority or transit packets are assigned
lower priority, or both, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
While TRAs are applicable to any network with class-
based traffic differentiation, in ad hoc networks using IEEE
802.11 they rely on the enhanced distributed channel ac-
cess (EDCA) function. EDCA defines four access categories
(ACs), each with its own set of medium access parameters
to determine the probability and duration of channel ac-
cess. Packets are mapped to ACs based on the Distributed
Services Code Point (DSCP) set in their IP header, which in
J. Konorski is with the Gdansk University of Technology, Gdansk, Poland,
e-mail: jekon@eti.pg.edu.pl
S. Szott is with the AGH University of Science and Technology, Krakow,
Poland, e-mail: szott@kt.agh.edu.pl.
1 2 3Wireless link Wireless link
Transit traffic (high priority)
Source traffic (low priority)
Fig. 1. Conceptual setting for a TRA [4]. Nodes 1 and 3 are out of
hearability range. The attacker node 2 can increase its QoS perception
by unduly promoting low-priority source traffic, demoting high-priority
transit traffic, or both.
turn is based on the traffic’s Class of Service (CoS) [5]. The
CoS-to-DSCP mapping is done according to administrator
policies, while the DSCP-to-AC mapping is implemented
by network-layer packet mangling software. Thus, software
such as Linux iptables is enough to execute a TRA
through a false DSCP-to-AC mapping. This is in contrast
to other selfish attacks, such as medium access parameter
modification, which require tampering with the wireless
card drivers. Furthermore, TRAs are difficult to detect:
determining if the monitored higher-layer traffic matches
its class designation requires deep packet inspection [6].
So far, TRAs have mostly been studied in single-hop
(ad hoc or infrastructure-based) wireless networks, where
they were observed to drastically reduce the throughput of
non-selfish nodes [6]. In multi-hop settings such as mobile
ad hoc networks (MANETs), the threat posed by TRAs is
aggravated by their multi-hop impact: once assigned false
priority, a packet retains its QoS designation further down
the path to the destination. Additionally, a selfish node can
both promote its source traffic and demote transit traffic [7].
An introductory study of the impact of TRAs and suitable
countermeasures for multi-hop wireless settings can be
found in [4]. In this paper, we perform a systematic analysis
using a game-theoretic approach to answer the following
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2question: can we define a rational strategy for nodes in a multi-
hop network subject to TRAs that converges to an equilibrium
in which all nodes are satisfied? We provide the following
specific contributions:
1) We discuss related work in the area of selfish attacks in
multi-hop wireless networks (Section 2).
2) From a formal model of quasi-static traffic patterns in
an IEEE 802.11 EDCA multi-hop network (Section 3),
we derive a formal model of plausible opportunistic
TRAs (Section 4).
3) Next, in Section 5, we present the results of a heuristic
rank-type end-to-end performance metric to quantify
the cost of TRAs both for attacker and non-attacker
(neutral) nodes, and verify this model using simula-
tions and alternative heuristics.
4) Using the cost metric as a payoff function, in Section 6
we formally define and characterize a noncooperative
one-shot TRA game in which both selfish and nonselfish
nodes are free to launch TRAs, hence the latter may de-
fend themselves against TRAs by responding in kind.
5) We argue that MANET nodes are likely to exhibit
bounded rationality [8], i.e., limited complexity, perse-
verance, and foresight; for such nodes we propose
in Section 7 a multistage TRA strategy called REST
(Random Exploration until Satisfaction Threshold) and
in Section 8 we verify analytically that it eventually
(with high probability) reaches a form of equilibrium
where the set of attacker nodes stabilizes.
6) We also verify experimentally that the multistage play
under REST most often ends up at a self-confirming
equilibrium of the one-shot TRA game, at which neu-
tral nodes typically suffer from TRAs less than initially.
Section 9 concludes the paper and outlines some directions
of future work. This paper is an extension of our previous
conference paper [9]. The key novel parts are related to
points 1 and 3–6 above.
2 RELATED WORK
Selfish attacks in multi-hop ad hoc networks have mostly
been studied at the network layer. The main attack under
consideration has been packet dropping, also referred to
as forwarding/relaying misbehavior. This attack can be con-
sidered as launched either on all packets (full dropping) or
only on selected packets (partial dropping). In the latter case
the dropping can be either probabilistic or deterministic
(e.g., it may specifically target some packet types such as
routing control packets).
The packet dropping attack has been widely analyzed
and various countermeasures have been proposed. Due
to node autonomy and lack of any administrative control
only “soft” solutions are possible. Some proposals involve
micropayment (credit) schemes, where a virtual currency
is earned for performing relaying services and next used
to buy similar services [10]. Others have focused on the
problem of explicitly identifying attackers. This can be
done passively, e.g., through a watchdog mechanism where
nodes promiscuously listen to the channel and observe
offending behavior [11], or actively, e.g., by using addi-
tional end-to-end acknowledgment packets to determine
which paths do not contain packet dropping attackers [12].
Attacker identification can be enhanced through complex
audit- and reputation-based schemes where a node cal-
culates reputation scores of neighbor nodes derived from
first-hand (watchdog-based) experience, and possibly also
reputation scores of more distant nodes from recommenda-
tions disseminated by their neighbors. Nodes with a low
reputation score are identified as attackers [13].
The main response to routing layer attacks has been of
a denial-of-service nature, i.e., refusing to forward packets
originating from attackers. Such an approach gives rise
to a number of game-theoretic analyses of the underlying
forwarding game. Various strategies (such as tit-for-tat)
have been considered for enforcement of honest packet for-
warding [14]. A complementary response is that of avoiding
paths containing attackers, i.e., routing traffic around them.
However, this is in fact beneficial to attackers, who spend
less energy as they are offered less transit traffic [15].
At the MAC layer most attacks have found the IEEE
802.11 distributed coordination function (DCF) [16] an easy
target. It has been shown in numerous studies that perform-
ing a backoff attack, i.e., changing the transmission deferment
parameters (such as idle carrier sensing or backoff times)
yields the attacker a considerable increase in throughput
and access delays at the cost of neutral nodes [17], [18].
This type of attack has been extensively studied, though
mostly in a single-hop setting which is not surprising given
the single-hop nature of the MAC layer.
TRAs should also be classified as MAC layer attacks.
Despite being executed at the IP layer (through modifying
packet headers), they rely on the underlying packet classifi-
cation and category prioritization at the MAC layer. Local-
scope TRAs were considered in [6]. However, multi-hop
settings can also be vulnerable: [19] gives an overview of
attacks in IEEE 802.11s mesh networks, [20] – in two-hop
relay networks, while [4] provides a tutorial overview of
TRAs in ad hoc networks.
From a detection viewpoint, TRAs are more challenging
in multi-hop settings than in single-hop ones, since it is
not always clear how local-scope manipulation of per-traffic
class handling translates into end-to-end per-flow or per-
packet symptoms. In addition, MAC-layer attacks such
as TRAs consist in aggressive competition for a limited
resource (the radio channel), bringing more benefit to the
attacker and more harm to the neutral nodes than do
routing-layer attacks, where the competition aspect is less
pronounced. Finally, an advantage of a single-hop setting is
that when a traffic remapping attacker has been identified,
it can be easily punished by neighbor neutral nodes via
responding in kind, e.g., increased transmission rate or
jamming [21], which is impossible against routing-layer
attacks. However, in a multi-hop setting such punishment
of TRAs is questionable. We conclude that studies of selfish
attacks performed at the MAC layer, in particular TRAs, in
multi-hop networks leave many insights to be gained.
3 NETWORK MODEL
LetG = 〈N,L〉 be a directed graph representing the current
(quasi-static) MANET hearability topology, where N is the
set of nodes, L ⊂ N × N , and (i, j) ∈ L iff i 6= j and j is
in the hearability range of i. By N∗ we denote the set of all
3directed acyclic routes in G (i.e., sequences of nodes such
that for each two consecutive nodes i and j, (i, j) ∈ L).
Let R ⊆ N∗ be the set of end-to-end routes in G as
determined by the routing algorithm in use. Each r ∈ R
is represented as a sequence (sr, . . . , dr) of involved nodes,
where sr and dr are source and destination nodes. We adopt
the following notation for routes: write i ∈ r if r involves
node i; for i, j ∈ r write i <r j (i ≤r j) if i precedes
(precedes or coincides with) j on r; for i ∈ r \ {dr} denote
by succr,i the immediate successor of i on r, and for i ∈
r \ {sr} define predr,i as the immediate predecessor of i on
r (predr,sr is defined as sr). Let Pr,i = {j|j ≤r i} be the set
of nodes that precede or coincide with i on r.1
Further assume that MANET traffic is composed of end-
to-end (e2e-)flows, each of which is a collection of packets
of the same class ∈ CoS and moving along the same
route. The corresponding MAC-layer frames are assigned
ACs, which they carry in the AC fields contained in their
headers, and handled accordingly by EDCA. Let AC be
the set of distinguished ACs. For ease of presentation we
restrict the used ACs to VO (assigned to voice traffic) and
BE (assigned to best-effort traffic), i.e., AC = {V O,BE},
with VO enjoying (statistical) priority over BE at the MAC
layer.
Since packet mangling software in fact amounts to a
CoS-to-AC mapping, one can define a function mang :
CoS → AC such that mang(class) is the AC that the class
of service class ∈ CoS should map to. Then, an e2e-flow of
this class of service is represented as (r, ac), where r ∈ R
is its route and ac = mang(class) ∈ AC is its intrinsic AC
as returned at sr. Let F ⊆ R × AC be the (quasi-static)
set of e2e-flows offered by MANET users. Without loss of
generality we assume that at least one e2e-flow is offered at
each node, i.e., {sr|(r, ac) ∈ F} = N .
We refer to hop (h-) flows as the granulation level at which
traffic is recognized at a next-hop node. At a given i ∈
r, packets of e2e-flow (r, ac) transmitted by j = predr,i,
whose frame headers contain AC fields with hac ∈ AC ,
are recognized as an h-flow (j, r, hac) (in general, it may
be that hac 6= ac, since the AC fields can be modified hop-
by-hop). For completeness, assume that e2e-flow (r, ac) is
recognized at sr as h-flow (sr, r, ac). Let H ⊆ N ×R×AC
be the set of recognizable h-flows.
Autonomous operation of node i is modeled as mapi :
H → AC . For an incoming h-flow (j, r, hac) recognized
at node i, where j = predr,i and i ∈ r \ {sr, dr},
mapi(j, r, hac) is the new AC field transmitted by i further
along r.
4 ATTACK MODEL
Definition 1. A traffic remapping attack (TRA) that a node
i ∈ r launches upon an incoming h-flow (j, r, hac), where
j = predr,i and i ∈ r \ {dr}, consists in configuring
mapi(j, r, hac) 6= hac.
1. Our MANET model tacitly assumes a node recognizes when the
preceding node is the source of an incoming e2e-flow, and the successor
node is the destination of outgoing e2e-flow. The former is enabled by
the address resolution protocol (ARP), the latter – by non-anonymous
routing.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of e2e-flows (solid lines), h-flows (patterned lines),
and related concepts in a grid-shaped MANET with A = {2}. The
plausible opportunistic attacker performs a TRA− on e2e-flow (r, V O),
hence hac2(r, V O) = BE. The attacked flow receives worse QoS on
all hops following node 2 (i.e., is forwarded as BE). The featured h-
flow (2, r, BE) (red) has to compete with all other h-flows for channel
access.
1
3 4 5
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9 10
Fig. 3. Example of a 10-node MANET. Lines indicate hearability be-
tween nodes. All connections are wireless.
Such a definition captures the fact that the setting of
AC fields under a TRA is both perfectly legal (in that
the use of mapj is feasible) and ill-willed (inconsistent
with mang). In light of this, behavior of node i with re-
spect to h-flow (j, r, hac) can be classified as (i) neutral,
if mapi(j, r, hac) = hac, (ii) upgrading TRA (TRA+), if
hac = BE and mapi(j, r, BE) = V O, or (iii) downgrading
TRA (TRA−) if hac = V O and mapi(j, r, V O) = BE.
Nodes that exhibit TRA behavior will be called attackers.
Definition 2. An attacker is plausible if it never down-
grades own source traffic or upgrades transit traffic, i.e.,
mapi(j, r, hac) = hac if (hac = V O and i = sr) or
(hac = BE and i 6= sr), and opportunistic if it launches a
TRA+ or a TRA− upon all h-flows it recognizes, subject to the
plausibility constraints.
Note that with respect to a given e2e-flow (r, ac), a
plausible opportunistic attacker i does not modify any AC
fields when i 6∈ r or i = dr (in the latter case i will
behave neutrally), or when ac = BE and i 6= sr , or, finally,
when ac = V O and i 6= sr and i recognizes the e2e-
flow as (j, r, BE), where j = predr,i (i.e., when a TRA−
has been launched by one of the nodes preceding i on
r). In our model, each attacker is assumed to be plausible
opportunistic. LetA denote the set of attackers (A ⊆ N ); the
case A = ∅ will be referred to as all-neutral. Fig. 2 illustrates
e2e-flows, h-flows, and a plausible opportunistic attack.
4TABLE 1
TRAs experienced by e2e-flows for A = {2, 3, 5, 8}
Flow r ac TRA
#1 1 3 4 5 8 10 VO TRA− at 3
#2 2 5 8 7 6 9 BE TRA+ at 2 & TRA− at 5
#3 3 4 7 8 VO
#4 4 3 6 9 BE
#5 5 4 7 6 VO
#6 6 3 1 BE
#7 7 4 5 VO
#8 8 5 2 BE TRA+ at 8 & TRA− at 5
#9 9 6 7 4 5 VO
#10 10 8 7 6 3 BE
We consider an example 10-node MANET with G repre-
sented as a hearability topology (node incidence matrix) as
visualized in Fig. 3. Table 1 illustrates per-flow perception
of TRAs for a given set A = {2, 3, 5, 8}. Routes of e2e-flows
were selected with uniformly distributed hop-lengths 2 . . . 5
and so that each node is a source of one e2e-flow, half of the
flows being VO (we will use this traffic pattern throughout
the remainder of the paper). For each e2e-flow it is indicated
what TRAs have been experienced and at which node.
The following can be observed in Table 1 regarding the
selected e2e-flows:
• e2e-flows #3 and #5 with ac = V O have an attacker
source, which, however, does not launch a TRA− due
to the plausibility constraints,
• likewise, e2e-flow #3 has an attacker destination, which
behaves neutrally due to the plausibility constraints,
• for the same reason, e2e-flows #3 and #10 with ac =
BE are not attacked at their attacker destinations, e2e-
flow #4 is not attacked at an attacker transit node 3,
which could only launch a TRA+, and e2e-flow #1 is
not attacked at its attacker source (node 1),
• e2e-flow #1 with ac = V O encounters two attacker
transit nodes, of which the first launches a TRA−,
hence the second no longer has to,
• e2e-flows #2 and #8 experience a combination of a
TRA+ at their source nodes and a TRA− at node 5;
this is the maximum number of attacks an e2e-flow can
experience.
Note that if all the nodes were plausible opportunistic
attackers (A = N ) then all e2e-flows with |r| > 2 would
be recognized at destination as BE h-flows.
5 TRA IMPACT
In order to assess the impact of TRAs, we have developed
a rank-based model as described in [9]. Each h-flow is
assigned a rank dependent on the number and priorities
of h-flows it has to compete with for the radio channel.
The h-flow ranks along a given route are then combined
into a per-flow cost metric that reflects the respective e2e-
flow’s throughput (for BE flows) or end-to-end delay (for
V O flows). Finally, for all flows originating at a node, the
per-flow costs are aggregated into a node cost.
Based on this model and for the above examples, un-
der the flow configuration of Table 1, Table 2 shows the
qualitative impact of TRAs launched by A = {1, 3, 8, 9}, as
compared to the all-neutral case. The status of an attacker
(neutral node) whose cost has increased is lose (mind),
otherwise it is don’t lose (don’t mind).
TABLE 2
Node classification after TRAs
Node A = {1, 3, 8, 9} A = {1 . . . 10}
1 lose lose
2 don’t mind don’t lose
3 don’t lose lose
4 mind lose
5 don’t mind don’t lose
6 don’t mind don’t lose
7 don’t mind lose
8 don’t lose don’t lose
9 don’t lose don’t lose
10 mind lose
One sees that TRA behavior can both be harmful to an
attacker and be harmless (even beneficial) to a node staying
neutral. The reason is that from the viewpoint of an e2e-
flow, TRAs may in various ways affect the number of com-
peting VO h-flows – either decrease it (TRA− may result
in weaker inter-flow competition) or increase it (TRA+ may
result in stronger intra-flow competition).
To validate the rank-based model, we implemented the
network topology of Fig. 3 and its corresponding traffic
flow configuration (Table 1) in the ns-3.28 simulator. We
assessed congruity, defined as the proportion of nodes
whose status (mind, lose, don’t mind, or don’t lose) upon
TRAs launched by a random attacker set agrees between the
simulation and the rank-based model. During the simula-
tion, nodes were classified as mind or lose if the throughput
of their BE flows dropped by 5% or if the delay of their
VO flows increased by more than 20 ms to exceed 100
ms. The following simulation settings were used: error-free
radio channels, IEEE 802.11a at the PHY layer, IEEE 802.11e
(EDCA) at the MAC layer, static routing, and constant bit-
rate UDP traffic for each flow, with 1500 B packets and equal
offered load calibrated to saturate the network. Each simu-
lation, lasting 200 s with 50 s warm-up time, was repeated
five times (more repetitions did not alter the results).
Fig. 4 presents the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of congruity obtained after simulating all the 210
possible attacker sets, producing a mean congruity of 0.76
for the rank-based model. For comparison consider a Pris-
oners’ Dilemma (PD) heuristic: if the number of attackers
in A exceeds (does not exceed) a certain threshold then all
the attacker nodes’ status is guessed as lose (don’t lose) and
the neutral nodes’ as don’t mind (mind). The corresponding
CDFs depicted in Fig. 4 for thresholds varying from 0 to |N |
produce mean values between 0.49 and 0.54, not far from
guessing by a fair coin toss. As another baseline, an unre-
alistic “informed gambler”, who knew an attacker (neutral)
node’s statistical chance of acquiring a lose (mind) status
under a random attacker set, might guess the node’s status
for a given A by tossing an appropriately biased coin. Con-
gruity would then be measured by the expected number
of guesses that match the simulation. The corresponding
CDF depicted in Fig. 4 produces a mean value of 0.82. We
conclude that the rank-based model is a good indicator
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Fig. 4. Congruity between ns-3 simulations and various analytical mod-
els.
of the impact of TRAs in saturated MANETs and we will
subsequently use it to analyze the arising noncooperative
TRA game.
6 ONE-SHOT TRA GAME
In the following, we analyze the arising noncooperative
one-shot game by providing a formal description and defin-
ing relevant types of equilibria.
6.1 Formal Description
The noncooperative one-shot game is defined as follows:
the nodes are players, mapi is node i’s strategy (attacker or
neutral), and cost is the (negative) payoff function (i.e., small
costs are pursued). A strategy profile (mapi, i ∈ N) can
be equivalently represented as the set A ⊆ N of plausible
opportunistic attackers. A formal description of the game is
therefore:
〈players, strategy space, payoffs〉 =
〈N, 2N , cost : N × 2N → R+〉. (1)
Some interesting strategy profiles are: ∅ (all-neutral,
corresponding to no TRAs being launched), and N (cor-
responding to each node being a plausible opportunistic
attacker). In the latter, any e2e-flow (r,BE) experiences a
TRA+ at sr, whereas any e2e-flow (r, V O) with |r| > 2
experiences a TRA− at the first node in r \ {sr, dr}.
An observation that necessitates subtler game-theoretic
treatment is that, contrary to the intuition whereby it is
beneficial to upgrade source traffic and to downgrade com-
peting transit traffic, the TRA game is not a multiperson PD.
Specifically, TRA does not dominate neutral behavior, as
seen from the presence of lose nodes in the above examples.
Neither is TRA necessarily harmful to neutral nodes, as
seen from the presence of don’t mind nodes. This is be-
cause of the complex interplay of MAC contention, EDCA
prioritization, and intra-flow competition due to multi-
hop forwarding in the presence of hidden nodes (packet
transmissions from one node compete with those from up-
and downstream nodes one or two hops away). Moreover,
A = ∅ may, but need not be Pareto superior to A = N ; in
fact, for some traffic patterns, the reverse is true [9].
6.2 Equilibria
To see if TRAs pose a real danger and so defense is nec-
essary, one needs to analyze the evolution of the strategy
profile (attacker set) A over time under some model of
repeatedly playing the TRA game. Given the non-PD nature
of the TRA game, it is not obvious what strategy profile
the nodes will eventually arrive at. MANET nodes can be
aptly modeled as boundedly rational, i.e., exhibiting limited
complexity, perseverance, and foresight. As such, they can
be expected to reach some form of equilibrium, cf. [6],
[8]. We will examine the eventual strategy profile against
two solution concepts of the one-shot TRA game: a Nash
equilibrium (NE) [22], where each player has played the best-
response strategy against the opponent strategy profile,
and a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) [23], where, based
on its received payoff, each player has reason to believe
it has played the best-response strategy. Note that while
rational play is known to lead to an NE [24], SCE is a
more suitable solution concept for a MANET, since the
nodes have imperfect information regarding the current
strategy profile (which they can only partially infer from
their received payoffs), hence are unaware if they are at an
NE.
For a set of attackers A ⊆ N and i ∈ N let
A[i] =
{
A \ {i}, i ∈ A
A ∪ {i}, i /∈ A . (2)
Definition 3. Aˆ ⊆ N is a (weak) NE of the one-shot TRA game
if
∀i ∈ N : costi(Aˆ) ≤ costi(Aˆ[i]). (3)
Numerical experiments show that the TRA game may
possess multiple NE. An exhaustive search of the set 2N
for 1000 random MANET instances with |N | = 10 and uni-
formly distributed route lengths 2 . . . 5 reveals that among
the 210 feasible strategy profiles, typically up to 5% are NE,
(cf. the x-coordinates of the NE series in Fig. 6).
For i ∈ N and A ⊆ N , let ZA(i) be the set of strategy
profiles in which node i selects the same strategy and
receives a similar payoff as in A:
ZA(i) = {A′ ⊆ N |(i ∈ A ⇐⇒ i ∈ A′)
∧ costi(A) ≈δ costi(A′)}, (4)
where a ≈δ b is a shorthand for |a−b|max{a,b} < δ and δ
represents the “resolution” of cost observation, i.e., the QoS
sensitivity.
Definition 4. A ⊆ N is an SCE of the one-shot TRA game if
∀i ∈ N ∃µ ∈ ∆(ZA(i)) : Eµcosti(A′) ≤ Eµcosti(A′[i]),
(5)
where ∆(Z) is a set of probability measures on set Z, Eµ is
the statistical expectation of µ, and A[i] is defined in (2). In a
simplified formulation, A is an SCE if
∀i ∈ N ∃A′ ∈ ZA(i) : costi(A′) ≤ costi(A′[i]). (6)
Our numerical analysis of 1000 random MANET in-
stances with the QoS sensitivity set at 5% shows that among
the 2|N | strategy profiles, from several percent to over 90%
are SCE (cf. the x-coordinates of the SCE series in Fig. 6).
67 MULTISTAGE TRA GAME
Suppose the TRA game is played in stages k = 1, 2, . . ., and
in each stage a node can set its behavior to either attack (i.e.,
become a plausible opportunistic attacker) or neutral. Let
A(k) ⊆ N be the set of attackers in stage k. Of interest is
the evolution (in particular, asymptotic behavior) of A(k),
starting from any A(0) ⊆ N , under a preferably simple
multistage attack strategy that can be justified as rational in
some sense and is ignorant of the current strategy profile
(in line with the imperfect information nature of the TRA
game). An example is the Interactive Trial and Error Learn-
ing (ITEL) strategy proposed in [25]. ITEL is governed by
permanent comparison of currently received payoff with
current expectation level. If the comparison is satisfactory,
a player occasionally explores a different strategy to see if it
leads to a better payoff and possibly sets a higher expecta-
tion level. If no strategy is being explored and yet a decrease
in payoff is observed due to the changing behavior of other
players, the player frequently experiments with different
strategies until received payoff satisfactorily compares with
a new, perhaps lower expectation level. With rare enough
exploration, ITEL is rational in the sense that the play stays
at an NE of the one-shot TRA game most of the time. On
the other hand, it does not explicitly define a “game over”
condition (whereupon the player “rests”, i.e., sticks to the
current strategy forever), which may force MANET nodes
to play the game indefinitely long.
We propose another heuristic multistage attack strat-
egy called REST (Random Exploration until Satisfaction
Threshold) with a rational trait and an explicit “game over”
condition signifying a node’s satisfaction. REST dictates a
node to:
1) disallow a behavior change if the current cost is the
smallest over a predefined number of recent stages
(referred to as satisfaction threshold and denoted m); the
node is then called satisfied,
2) if a behavior change is allowed (node is currently
dissatisfied), decide it with a probability that depends
on the history of own play; the change from the current
behavior is driven by the excess of past stages where
the same behavior led to a cost increase over those
where it did not.
REST can be formalized by specifying how A(k) derives
from A(k − 1). This is given by Algorithm 1, where εpi
denotes a random event occurring with probability pi,
σ : R → [0, p] is a continuous nondecreasing function with
p ≤ 1, lim
x→−∞σ(x) = 0, and limx→∞σ(x) = p, and the logical
condition ϕi(k) expresses node i’s satisfaction in stage k:
ϕi(k) =
{
false, k < m
∀l=1...mcosti(A(k)) ≤ costi(A(k − l)), k ≥ m.
(7)
Note that the first m stages make an exploratory warm-up,
where all nodes are considered dissatisfied and TRAs are
launched at random, governed by εpi .
8 MULTISTAGE GAME ANALYSIS
A multistage attack strategy can be characterized by the
following properties: convergence, determining the game du-
ration until all nodes are satisfied, rationality, reflecting the
Algorithm 1: REST multistage attack strategy
Data: Stage k
Result: Set of attackers A(k)
if k = 0 then
initialize Lose, DontLose, Mind, and DontMind
counters;
A(k)← any subset of N ;
else
A(k)← {i ∈ A(k − 1) :
ϕi(k − 1) ∨ ¬εσ(Losei−DontLosei)} ∪ {i /∈ A(k − 1) :¬ϕi(k − 1) ∧ εσ(Mindi−DontMindi)};
for i ∈ N do
if costi(A(k)) > costi(A(k − 1)) then
if i ∈ A(k − 1) then
increment Losei
else
increment Mindi
else
if i ∈ A(k − 1) then
increment DontLosei
else
increment DontMindi
end
end
end
end
nodes’ subjective evaluation of eventually received payoffs,
and defensibility, measuring the ability of initially neutral
nodes to eventually improve their payoffs.
8.1 Convergence
Starting from some fixed A(0), the evolution of A(k) under
REST can be easily recreated in Monte Carlo simulations.
We carried out simulations for the MANET topology of
Fig. 3 and the traffic pattern of Table 1, with σ(x) =
p/(1 + e−x/x0) (the sigmoid function) whose vertical and
horizontal scale parameters were set to p = 0.95 and
x0 = 1, respectively.
Fig. 5 plots against k the following characteristics, which
are averages from 100 random runs with A(0) = ∅
• number of attackers, i.e., |A(k)|,
• number of dissatisfied nodes, i.e., |{i ∈ N : ¬ϕi(k)}|.
The plots are obtained for cost values from the rank-based
model [9] as well as for those based on the ns-3.28 simu-
lations described in Section 5. The difference between the
plots is quantitative, not qualitative, and so only the rank-
based model will be used for further analysis.
We observe that A(k) typically converges over time to
an all-satisfied equilibrium A∞ such that ∅ 6= A∞ 6= N .2
A∞ may differ from run to run on account of the ran-
domness inherent in REST, and may also depend on A(0).
However, averaged over multiple runs, |A∞| is insensitive
to A(0). Moreover, costi(A∞) ≤ costi(A(0)) is observed
for some or all i /∈ A∞. This confirms that at an all-satisfied
equilibrium, TRAs can be harmless to neutral nodes.
2. The notion of all-satisfied equilibrium reflects the salient features
of bounded rationality [8]: the limited satisfaction threshold m implies
a node’s constrained complexity and resources, and the form of (7)
implies limited perseverance and a myopic attitude. In Section 8.2,
we demonstrate through simulations that under REST, all-satisfied
equilibria are often SCE.
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Extensive simulations show that the convergence occurs
regardless of scenario (albeit may be slow for large m),
i.e., all the nodes eventually become satisfied. The intuitive
explanation is that nodes whose costs have not increased
recently do not leave the satisfied set, and the others are
more likely to try different behavior and so to lower their
costs in the near future (indeed, observed nodes’ costs cease
to increase from some stage on). We now provide a proof of
this convergence.
Recall that in REST, node behavior is dictated by the
function σ : R→ [0, p], where p ≤ 1. To guarantee eventual
convergence to all-satisfied, it is enough to ensure in each
stage a strictly positive probability that no node will change
its behavior from now on.
Assertion 1. Let all the nodes play the multistage TRA game
according to REST. If p < 1 then as k →∞, A(k) converges to
some A∞ with probability 1.
Proof. Denote
ϕ
(y)
i (k) =
{
false, k < y
∀l=1...ycosti(A(k)) ≤ costi(A(k − l)), k ≥ y
(8)
so that ϕ(m)i (k) = ϕi(k). Let vi(k) ∈ {1, . . . ,m} be the
number of stages since node i last became dissatisfied,
i.e., vi(k) = min
{
m,max{y | ϕ(y)i = true}
}
, and v(k) =
(vi(k), i ∈ N) be called the satisfaction vector. In successive
stages, v(k) evolves in a nondeterministic way according
to REST, possibly ending up at the absorbing satisfaction
vector (m, . . . ,m), which corresponds to the stabilization
of A(k) at some A∞.
In stage k, let D(k) = {i ∈ N |ϕi(k) = false}
be the set of currently dissatisfied nodes, L(k) (DL(k))
= {i ∈ A(k) ∩ D(k) | state of i = lose (don’t lose)}, and
M(k) (DM(k)) = {i ∈ (N\A(k)) ∩ D(k) | state of i =
mind (don’t mind)}. Next, let Ev(k) be the event of a con-
tinuation of the game till the absorbing satisfaction vector
(m, . . . ,m) is reached, without any node changing its be-
havior, i.e., A(k) = A(k + 1) = · · · = A∞. In each stage
along such a continuation, the sets D(k), L(k), DL(k),
M(k), and DM(k) remain the same, the counters Losei,
DontLosei, Mindi, and DontMindi are incremented by
1 for i ∈ L(k), i ∈ DL(k), i ∈ M(k), and i ∈ DM(k),
respectively, whereas v(k) becomes v(k) + (1, . . . , 1). It
follows that a continuation till absorption lasts at most m
stages.
The probability of node i ∈ L(k) not changing
its behavior till absorption is bounded below by (1 −
σ(Losei + m − DontLosei))m and of node i ∈ DL(k),
by (1 − σ(Losei − DontLosei))m. Analogously, for node
i ∈ M(k), this probability is bounded below by (1 −
σ(Mindi +m−DontMindi))m and for node i ∈ DM(k),
by (1 − σ(Mindi − DontMindi))m. As all these lower
bounds are larger than (1 − p)m, we conclude that for any
v(k) ∈ {1, . . . ,m}|N | we have Pr[Ev(k)] ≥ (1−p)m|N | > 0.
Consider now a family of events Fj , j = 1, 2, . . . ,
each of which signifies that a continuation till absorption
without any node changing its behavior does not start
in j successive states beginning in stage k, i.e., Fj =
¬Ev(k) ∩ · · · ∩ ¬Ev(k+j−1). In light of the lower bound for
Pr[Ev(k)] we note that Pr[F1] ≤ 1 − (1 − p)m|N | < 1,
and for all j > 1, Pr[Fj | Fj−1] ≤ 1 − (1 − p)m|N | and
Pr[Fj | ¬Fj−1] = 0. Hence, Pr[Fj ] ≤ (1 − (1 − p)m|N |)j .
This implies
∑∞
j=0 Pr[Fj ] < ∞ and, by the Borel-Cantelli
lemma, Pr
[
lim sup
j→∞
Fj
]
= 0, i.e., a continuation towards
the absorbing satisfaction vector eventually occurs with
probability 1.
8.2 Rationality
An interesting characterization of the observed A∞, reflect-
ing the rationality of REST, is that there are eventually very
few nodes i for which costi(A
[i]
∞) < costi(A∞), and which
also fulfill the following:
• if i ∈ A∞ then ∀j∈A[i]∞costj(A
[i]
∞) ≥ costj(A∞), i.e.,
node i is an attacker, but if had stayed neutral, would
have decreased its cost without decreasing that of any
other attacker (hence, without bolstering other attack-
ers’ satisfaction),
• if i /∈ A∞ then ∀j /∈A[i]∞costj(A
[i]
∞) ≤ costj(A∞), i.e.,
node i is neutral, but if had attacked, would have
decreased its cost without increasing that of any other
neutral node (hence, without provoking neutral nodes’
dissatisfaction, which might lead to more TRAs).
In the simulations, the former type of node i was almost
never observed, and the latter averaged around a few
percent of |N |.
One can also judge the rationality of REST by NE hits,
the percentage of runs where an NE is eventually arrived
at, in relation to the proportion of NE among the 2|N |
feasible strategy profiles. If the former is distinctly larger
than the latter, the eventual NE are not “statistically ac-
cidental”, and the strategy can be said to be NE-seeking.
The plot in Fig. 6 has been obtained from 1000 MANET
instances with m = 10 and x0 = 1. Each dot corresponds
to a MANET instance with “NE hits” obtained from 100
simulation runs. The NE-seeking property is clearly visible,
though in absolute terms there are few NE hits. However,
the situation is different for SCE hits, the percentage of
runs where an SCE is asymptotically arrived at, in relation
to the proportion of SCE among the 2|N | feasible strategy
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Fig. 6. Rationality of REST. If a MANET instance produces a dot
above the y = x line then the eventually reached NE (SCE) are not
“statistically accidental”.
profiles. Here, the SCE-seeking property of REST is clearly
visible. We offer the following explanation. Condition (7)
is a heuristic that pursues low cost at all nodes, thereby
promoting SCE, as illustrated in Figure 7 for a random 10-
node MANET instace. This figure shows the normalized
cost costi(A)/costi(∅) of each node i for all A ⊆ N in the
four possible cases:
(i) i ∈ A and costi(A) ≤ costi(A[i]), i.e., i is an attacker
and attack is i’s best response,
(ii) i ∈ A and costi(A) > costi(A[i]), i.e., i is an attacker
and attack is i’s worst response,
(iii) i /∈ A and costi(A) ≤ costi(A[i]), i.e., i is neutral and
neutral is i’s best response,
(iv) i /∈ A and costi(A) > costi(A[i]), i.e., i is not an
attacker and neutral is i’s worst response.
It is visible that if costi(A) is sufficiently small then either
case (i) or (iii) occurs, or there exists a different A′ for which
costi(A) ≈δ costi(A′) and case (i) or (iii) occurs with A′
substituted for A. Hence, A meets the conditions of SCE.
8.3 Defensibility
When playing the TRA game according to REST, nodes
that initially were neutral (outside A(0)) defend themsleves
against TRAs by responding in kind (i.e., occasionally
launching TRAs). The fact that not all the nodes end up
as attackers, but all are eventually satisfied with their costs
(cf. Section 8.1), suggests that harmful TRAs are curbed in
the first place, whereas harmless ones need not be. It also
shows that responding in kind is not a punishment that
leads to a spiral of “punishing the punishers” [26]. From
the viewpoint of defense against TRAs, of interest is also
how many initially neutral nodes can eventually improve
their cost with respect to the all-neutral case A = ∅. For
such nodes, we compare the initial and eventual percentage
of “beneficiaries” (don’t mind nodes); if the latter percentage
is larger, REST can be said to eventually defend neutral
nodes against TRAs. The plot in Fig. 8 was obtained for
1000 random 10-node MANET instances, each producing
a dot by averaging over 100 simulation runs with random
A(0), m = 10, and x0 = 1. Of the 1000 dots, 785 lie above
the x = y line, therefore a quantitative measure of REST
defensibility, referred to as percentage improvement rating, can
be put at 78.5% for this REST configuration.
8.4 Influence of Satisfaction Threshold and Sigmoid
Scaling
Intuitively, increasing the satisfaction threshold m slows
down the convergence to A∞, measured as the number
of stages until all the nodes are satisfied, starting from a
random A(0). Meanwhile, increasing the horizontal scal-
ing parameter x0 of the sigmoid function strengthens the
exploratory element of node behavior under REST. Is this
accompanied by an increase of SCE hits and and the per-
centage improvement rating? To see this, we have simulated
the multistage TRA game for p = 0.95, m = 5, 10, and 25,
and x0 = 1, 2, 5, and 20. Given the percentage of multistage
TRA game runs ending up at an SCE, %SCE hits, and the
proportion of SCE in the strategy space 2N of the one-shot
TRA game, %SCE (cf. Fig. 6), we use SCEHitExponent =
ln(%SCE hits)/ln(%SCE) as a natural synthetic measure
of SCE hits, whose value varies from 1 to 0 as the point
(%SCE, %SCE hits) moves away from the diagonal of the
square [0, 1]2 towards its left and/or upper side, close to
the curve %SCEhits = %SCESCEHitExponent. The dis-
tance between SCEHitExponent and 1 quantifies the SCE-
seeking property of REST. (Note that SCEHitExponent
is nondeterminate if %SCE = 0; also, to reduce the
impact of outliers, SCEHitExponent is taken to be
ln(0.999)/ln(%SCE) if %SCEhits = 100%.)
In Fig. 9 we plot the impact of m and x0 on the average
(a) convergence (as measured by the number of stages until
all nodes are satisfied) and rationality (as measured by
SCEHitExponent) as well as (b) defensibility (as mea-
sured by percentage improvement rating) based on 1000
random 10-node MANET instances, each evaluated with
100 independent simulation runs. Instances with nondeter-
minate SCEHitExponent were excluded. One sees that
configuration of m and x0 allows to trade off the conver-
gence, rationality, and defensibility of REST (the latter char-
acteristic generally remaining high). Similar simulations
were carried out for ITEL (cf. Section 7). Since ITEL does not
explicitly define “game over” conditions, we redefined the
satisfaction of a node as a favorable comparison of received
payoff with current expectation level in the last m stages,
with m configured so as to optimize defensibility. Under
such “game over” conditions, ITEL turns out distinctly
inferior to REST in terms of convergence and rationality,
and only slightly better in terms of defensibility.
9 CONCLUSION
We have proposed a formal model of TRAs in multi-hop
ad hoc networks. This allowed us to rigorously define the
arising TRA game and propose a boundedly rational multi-
stage attack strategy called REST. We have shown that REST
evolves towards all-satisfied equilibira, where the number
of attackers is stable and all nodes are satisfied. This conver-
gence is guaranteed for all but one of the strategy’s parame-
ter settings. Furthermore, we have analyzed the rationality
of REST by displaying its SCE-seeking properties and its
efficiency by showing that initially neutral nodes can (in a
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Fig. 8. Defensibility of REST.
majority of cases) improve their perceived QoS by playing
this strategy. Finally, REST’s configuration parameters al-
low tradeoffs between convergence and achieving SCE as
well as between rationality and defensibility. We conclude
that REST both expresses selfish nodes’ bounded rationality
and yields non-selfish nodes an effective respond-in-kind
defense against TRAs.
Further analysis of REST should be conducted in realis-
tic wireless networks to reveal the impact of transmission
impairments, traffic volume and fluctuations, and end-
to-end protocols such as TCP. Additionally, future work
should aim to systematically prevent or curb only harmful
TRAs, as was done in a single-hop setting [6]. Finally, the
applicability of the TRA game and the REST strategy to
other distributed network settings is left for future research.
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